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The Perfect in Context: A Corpus Study 
Atsuko Nishiyama and Jean-Pierre Koenig* 
1 Introduction 
Several recent studies of the English present perfect have argued that its in-
terpretation requires addressees to draw pragmatic inferences (Portner 2003, 
Borillo et al. 2004, Nishiyama and Koenig 2004). Portner (2003) and Borillo 
et al. (2004) argue that the perfect presupposes or elaborates a topic, whose 
identity must be inferred; Nishiyama and Koenig (2004) suggest that the per-
fect introduces into the discourse free variables whose values must also be 
inferred and constitute implicitures in the sense of Bach (1994). However nei-
ther proposal specifies the rules speakers may or must use to draw the relevant 
pragmatic inferences or whether such inferences are plausibly drawn by ad-
dressees. This paper purports to fill this gap through the study of over 600 
English perfect examples from a diverse range of genres (newspapers, discus-
sions, conversations, and narrative texts). The results of our study show (i) that 
the required inferences belong to one of only a few inference patterns and are 
easy enough to be plausibly drawn; (ii) that Borillo eta/. 's (2004) and Port-
ner's (2003) topic-driven analysis of the perfect cannot account for all uses of 
the English present perfect. 
2 Two Recent Inferential Theories of the Present Perfect 
Discourse topics and the perfect. Portner (2003) proposes that part of the 
meaning of the perfect consists in a presupposition that sentences that include 
a verb in the perfect are answers to the discourse topic, which he regards as 
an implicit question. For example, sentence (I) presupposes the availability 
to speech participants of a question such as (2a) and can be used in a context 
such as (2b ). 
(1) Mary has read Middlemarch. 
(2) a. We need to get an explanation of George Eliot's style; who can we 
ask? 
*We would like to thank Jiirgen Bohnemeyer, Paula Chesley, Roelant Ossewaarde, 
Christopher Phipps, and the audience of the 29th Penn Linguistics Colloquium for com-
ments on the content of this paper. 
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b. Well, George Eliot wrote Middlemarch, and if someone reads an 
author's books, they understand her style. Unless they're stupid of 
course. Mary is smart, and she has read Middlemarch ... 
Borillo eta!. (2004) propose, within Segmented Discourse Representation 
Theory (SDRT), that the perfect creates an Elaboration structure in which the 
utterance situation or writing context provides a topic which sentences con-
taining a perfect elaborate on. 
Inferred perfect state view. Nishiyama and Koenig (2004) modify and ex-
tend the standard analysis of the perfect within Discourse Representation The-
ory (DRT) outlined in Kamp and Reyle (1993), van Eijck and Kamp (1997) 
and de Swart (1998) and propose the following meaning for the perfect: 
(3) The perfect introduces into a Discourse Representation Structure: 
i. an eventuality ev, whose temporal trace precedes reference timer 
(speech time n for present perfects) (7(ev) -< r), and 
1i. a state s (hereafter, the perfect state), whose temporal trace over-
laps reference timer (7(s) or) and whose category is inferable 
from the occurrence of ev. 
ev,s,n 
¢(ev) 
7(ev)-< n 
X(s) 
7(s) on 
Figure 1: DRS for the meaning of the present perfect 
Figure 1 represents the simplified DRS that results from the interpretation of 
a sentence whose verb and arguments contribute the eventuality description ¢ 
(hereafter, the base eventuality description). The first line lists the discourse 
referents introduced by the present perfect. ev is an eventuality of any type, 
which the second line, i.e., the first discourse condition, requires to satisfy 
the base eventuality description ¢. 7 is a function that maps an eventuality 
onto its temporal trace. 7( ev) -< n on the third line says that the temporal 
trace of ev precedes speech time n (-<=temporal precedence), since reference 
time r equals speech time n in the present perfect. The fourth line, 7( s) o n, 
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says that the temporal trace of the perfect state s overlaps speech time n ( o 
=temporal overlap). Nishiyama and Koenig's main innovation is the claim 
that the category of the perfect state s is semantically a free variable (X in 
Figure 1), which must be filled in by the addressee (Kay and Zimmer 1978, 
Partee 1984, Bach 1994). The presence of a free variable X is a semantic 
constraint (imposed by the perfect form), but the value of X has to be filled 
in via pragmatic inferences. Possible values of X for sentences (4) and (5) 
and the traditional labels for the corresponding uses of the perfect are shown 
informally in (4a)-(4b) and (5a)-(5b), respectively.' 
( 4) Ken has broken his leg. 
a. His leg is currently broken. 
-Entailed resultative reading 
(X(s)=Ken'sJeg_be_broken(s)) 
b. Ken is behind in his project. 
-Conversationally implicated resultative reading (Depraetere 1998) 
(X ( s )=Ken_be_behind_in_his_project( s)) 
c. #Susan is married to Mike. 
(X(s) =Susan_be_married_to..Mike (s).) 
( 5) Ken has lived in London. 
a. Ken (still) lives in London. 
-Continuative reading 
(X ( s )= KenJive_in_London( s)) 
b. Ken knows good restaurants in London. 
-Conversationally implicated resultative reading 
(X ( s )=Ken_know _good_restaurants_in_London( s)) 
Nishiyama and Koenig argue that the pragmatic process through which 
the value of X is determined is, broadly speaking, neo-Gricean in nature, 
and can be modeled using the Minimization and Maximization principles of 
(Levinson 2000). The fact that the inference process addressees must engage 
in is governed by these principles, properly exclude as values of X temporally 
coincidental but otherwise unrelated states such as ( 4c ). In normal contexts, 
addressees cannot infer that Susan is married to Mike from the fact that Ken 
1 We call entailed resultative perfect reading readings in which the value of X cor-
responds to the resultant state entailed by the base eventuality description. We call 
conversationally implicated resultative perfect reading or (non-entailed) resultative 
perfect reading the reading that results when the value of X is a resultant state that 
is not entailed from the base eventuality description. 
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broke his leg. Despite its success in accounting for all uses of the English 
present perfect without resorting to ambiguity, Nishiyama and Koenig's pro-
posal, like Portner's and Borillo's, does not provide any details on the rules 
addressees might use to derive the value of X; nor does it provide corpus ev-
idence of the plausibility of the inferential process that it claims hearers or 
readers of sentences containing a perfect must engage in. The next section 
presents the results of a corpus study that provides such evidence. 
3 A Corpus Study 
We collected data from various genres, two newspapers of the same date (July 
1st 1996), the first two discussion articles of the same month of the year (July 
1996) in CQ Researcher Online (http://library2.cqpress.com/cqresearcher), 
conversation data from the Switchboard Corpus (Graff et al. 1998, files 
sw2001.txt through sw2019.txt), and narrative data from Netlibrary 
(http://www.netlibrary.com/) (two novels, one biography). We examined the 
interpretation of all present perfect examples including those that occurred in 
embedded clauses in the corpora. Non-finite forms of the perfect, e.g., the 
perfect following modal auxiliaries or to were excluded from analysis, as well 
as the idiomatic expression 've got to. 
We first classified all examples in accordance with the traditional labels 
for perfect uses. 81.82 percent of all examples were either entailed resultative 
perfects or continuative perfects (Type (i) below)2 ; most of the other examples 
were existential or non-entailed resultative perfects (18.02 percent) (mostly 
Type (ii) and (iii) below). Table 1 shows the percentages of entailed resultative, 
continuative, existential, and non-entailed resultative perfect readings in each 
corpus. 
2The percentage includes the examples which can be categorized either as entailed 
resultative or continuative perfect uses in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Numbers and Percentages of entailed, continuative, existential, and 
resultative perfect examples in corpora1 
Entailed Continuative Existential Non-entailed Others Total 
resultative resultative 
A 24 22 0 13 2 61 
B 64 68 6 13 0 151 
c 86 52 8 7 2 155 
D 32 38 10 20 0 100 
E 46 59 9 23 I 138 
Total 252 239 33 76 5:l 605 
(41.65%) (39.50%) (5.46%) (12.56%) (0.83%) (100%) 
1 See Michaelis ( 1998) for definitions of the uses of the perfect mentioned in the 
table. 
2 Four of these five examples can be interpreted either as entailed resultative or 
continuative perfect readings, while one can be interpreted either as a continuative 
or resultative perfect. 
A Newspaperl:Reuters Financial News, 07.01.1996. 
8 Newspaper 2: Wall Street Journal, 07.01.1996. 
c Discussion:CQ Researcher, 07.1996. 
° Conversation:Switchboard Corpus (SW2001-SW2019) 
E Narrative: H. G. Wells, The Time Machine; I. Bernard Cohen, Howard Aiken: Por-
trait of a Computer Pioneer; Willa Cather, Of Pioneer! 
4 Default Inference Patterns 
We then determined for each type of perfect use which inference rules ad-
dressees must have used, were they to successfully determine the category of 
the perfect state which the perfect introduces in discourse according to Kamp 
and Reyle and others (the value of X in Nishiyama and Koenig (2004)). We 
isolated three major classes of inference patterns. 
Type (i) Entailed or continuative perfects: For this most frequent class of 
examples, readers need draw only trivial inferences in order to find the value 
of X. The state either described or entailed by the base eventuality description 
persists until the present. To derive X, readers need only apply the presump-
tion of persistence default rule (McDermott 1982). ( 6) and (7) are examples 
of continuative perfect readings, while (8) and (9) illustrate entailed resultative 
perfect readings. 
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(6) ... ,he has been a member of her household ever since. (X=He is a 
member of her household.) (Cather 1996, p.24) 
(7) Since the war ended, the U.S. has kept 5,000 troops in Saudi-provided 
housing, .... (X =The U.S. keeps 5,000 troops in Saudi-provided hous-
ing.) (Graff 1995-1997, Wall Street Journa/.07.01.1996) 
(8) Yeltsin's health has become a major issue in the closing days of Rus-
sia's presidential race. (X =Yeltsin's health is a major issue in the clos-
ing days of Russia's presidential race.) (Graff 1995-1997, Wall Street 
Journal. 0 7. 0 1.1996) 
(9) A few tribes have managed to establish a foothold in their local economies 
without the benefit of gaming revenues. (X =A few tribes have a 
foothold in their local economies without the benefit of gaming rev-
enues.) (Cooper 1996, July 12) 
Type (ii) Speech Act/Epistemic perfects. Some perfect sentences have speech 
act verbs or epistemic verbs as their main verbs and the value of X can be in-
ferred via default rules that reflect the speaker and hearer's expectations about 
each other's speech acts. They can be divided into two subtypes. 
Subtype (ii-a) Evidential uses. Speakers and authors may use a perfect to 
communicate that the complement of performative or epistemic verbs such as 
say, promise, or see presently holds or is likely to hold in the future, as seen in 
(10) and (11). 
(10) Sumitomo has said its losses from Mr. Hamanaka's trading stand at 
$1.8 billion. (X=Sumitomo's losses from Mr. Hamanaka's trading 
stand at $1.8 billion.) (Graff1995-1997, Wall Street Journa/.07.01.1996) 
( 11) Britain's opposition Labor Party has also promised a ban on all to-
bacco advertising if it wins the election due to be held by May next 
year. (X =There is likely to be a ban on all tobacco advertising if the 
Labor Party wins the election.) (Graff 1995-1997, Reuters Financial 
News, 07.01.1996.) 
To infer the value of X, readers of (10) rely on the default rule that 
if somebody says something, it is (typically) true. Similarly, to infer the 
value of X, readers of ( 11) rely on the default rule that if somebody promises 
something, it is likely to become true. Both rules are based on the sincerity 
conditions associated with the speech acts of saying and promising, respec-
tively (Searle 1969, Searle and Vanderveken 1985) and reflect our expectations 
that speakers are sincere when they speak. They can be described as follows 
(>means 'nonmonotonically/defeasibly entail' Pelletier and Asher (1997)). 
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(12) \:lx\:lp(say(x,p)>true(p)) 
(13) \:lx\:lp(promise(x, p)> likely(Future(p))) 
Relying on such rules, readers can easily infer that what Sumitomo says 
is true in (1 0) or that what the Labor Party promised is likely to become true 
if they win in (11). 
Subtype (ii-b) Topic negotiation. Speakers sometimes use a perfect at the 
beginning of a conversation to set up a topic. (14)-(15) are examples of such 
uses from the Switchboard corpus. 
(14) Have you done a lot of camping recently? (X=I want to talk about 
camping.) (Graff eta!. 1998, sw2009.txt) 
(15) A: Have you seen DANCING WITH WOLVES? (X=I want to talk 
about the movies.) 
B: Yeah. I've seen that, that's, uh, that was a really good movie. (Graff 
eta!. 1998, sw2010.txt) 
The speaker in these examples uses the present perfect to negotiate a topic 
she wants to talk about. She does so by asking the addressee whether an epis-
temic pre-condition for having a conversation on her chosen topic is satisfied, 
by asking, e.g., the extent of the addressee's experience or knowledge of the 
topic. In such uses, the speaker counts on the addressee making use of the 
default rule that if she wants to know whether he knows something (and thus 
can talk about it), she probably wants to talk about it. 
(16) \:lx\:ly( ask..addressee_know (x, y) > wanualk (x, y)) 
In (15) the addressee (B) accepts the topic by saying that he has had the 
experience of watching the movie and therefore knows and can talk about it. 
Importantly, the perfect is used in examples (14) and (15) at the start of a new 
conversation between two strangers where it makes little sense to presume the 
existence of a presupposed or shared topic between the speech participants. 
Such examples are therefore difficult to explain for Portner (2003) and Borillo 
eta!. (2004) who claim that the use of a perfect form presumes the existence 
of a shared topic in the context. 
Of course one might argue that the perfect putative presupposition that 
there is a mutually agreed topic for the current conversation may be accommo-
dated in examples such as ( 14) and (15). We find this possibility quite unlikely. 
Accommodation is a repair strategy by which addressees can make sense out 
of the speaker's utterance, despite its pragmatic infelicity (Lewis 1979). For 
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example, if an addressee does not know that the speaker has a daughter and 
hears that the speaker's daughter is getting married, then he might be willing 
to accommodate the failed presupposition and simply assume post facto that 
the speaker has a daughter. But consider the conversational turns that follow 
example (15). 
(17) B: Probably one of the best things about it was the scenery and, uh, I 
thought the story was pretty good, too. I, I think Kevin Costner did a 
really good job with it. 
A: Have you ever lived in that part of the country? (X =I want to talk 
about that part of the country.) 
B: No. I haven't. 
A: Have you ever visited it? (X =I want to talk about that part of the 
country.) 
B: Urn, I've visited the Wyoming area. I'm not sure exactly where 
DANCES WITH WOLVES was filmed. 
A: I think it was the black hills of South Dakota. 
B: Could be. I, n-, I haven't been to South Dakota. Have, have you 
been up to that? (X=I want to talk about South Dakota.) 
A: Well, I lived in Omaha for five, 
B: Oh. (Graffet al. 1998, sw2010.txt) 
In (17) participant A uses the perfect several other times to shift topic. By 
uttering Have you ever visited it? or Have you ever lived in that part of the 
country?, the speaker suggests that she now wishes to discuss the region in 
which Dances with wolves was filmed. The repeated use of the perfect to 
introduce or shift topic makes it unlikely that B accommodates a presupposed 
existing topic: The notion of topic shift is inconsistent with accommodating a 
presupposition that there exists a mutually agreed upon topic. 
Furthermore, these examples and several similar ones we found were 
taken from a telephone conversation between two people who do not know 
each other and who could chat about whatever they wanted although a topic 
was suggested by the research team that culled the Switchboard Corpus. The 
fact that there is less mutual ground among strangers, the fact that no shared 
situational information could provide a topic makes it also particularly un-
likely for the speaker to expect the hearer to be willing to accommodate the 
presupposition that there was an already agreed upon topic. Resorting to ac-
commodation to explain away examples (14)-(17) would render the notion of 
presupposition vacuous in that it is hard to imagine what unsatisfied presuppo-
sition would not be able to be accommodated, if those in examples ( 14 )-(17) 
are. 
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Finally, examples such as (14) and (15) are particularly problematic for 
Portner (2003) who takes the view that topics are implicit questions to which 
sentences whose main verb is in the perfect form provide an answer, since 
these perfects occur in interrogative clauses. 
Type (iii) Common sense entailment Authors sometimes use the perfect to 
indicate that the occurrence of an event provides evidence or an explanation 
for the truth of a claim she made or will make. The value of X in these cases 
is the state description conveyed by a clause that preceded or followed the 
sentence containing the perfect. For example, in (18) the event introduced by 
the perfect sentence (that the U.S. Air Force flew an average of 1,500 missions 
a month) supports and provides evidence for the assertion conveyed by the first 
sentence. The fact that the U.S. forces flew so many missions serves as proof 
that they were busy. 
(18) Iraq still keeps U.S. forces busy, too (=X). U.S. Air Force fighter 
jets have flown an average of I ,500 missions a month over southern 
Iraq since 1992, in an effort to make sure Iraq doesn't violate a no-
fly zone or attack its Shiite population. (Graff 1995-1997, Wall Street 
Journal. 0 7. 0 1.1996) 
In order to find the value of X in example (18), readers need to make use 
of a rather specific common sense entailment rule such as (19). 
(19) Vx'Vy(fly_1,500_missions_a_month_over (y, x) > keep_busy (x, y)) 
(20) is a similar example. 
(20) House Democratic leader Richard Gephardt of Missouri, who has been 
less enthusiastic about budget cutting than Mr. Clinton, has played 
a key role in recruiting the party's congressional candidates. Many 
are merely reflecting his priorities, as opposed to those of the White 
House.(=X(s)) (Graff 1995-1997, Wall Street Journa/.07.01.1996) 
Here, Gephardt's key role in recruiting candidates explains that many con-
gressional candidates reflect his priorities. Readers infer the value of X, using 
another rather specific common sense entailment rule, the one stated in (21 ). 
(21) Vx'Vy(play.Jce)JJ"Ole.recruiting(x, y) > reflect.priorities_of(y, x)) 
It is striking that the value of X for the overwhelming majority of present 
perfect examples we have looked at so far can be found through very general 
default principles. 81.82 percent of all the examples belong to Type (i), where 
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the value of X can be derived through the principle of persistence. 11.24 per-
cent of the examples belong to Type (ii), where the value of X can be inferred 
through general default expectations regarding speech acts. In total, 93.06 per-
cent of the examples of perfect we looked at require general default rules to 
assign a value to X. Only a small number of examples ( 4.63 percent), such 
as (18) and (20), requires specific commonsense knowledge rules. Table 2 
summarizes the types of rules used to determine the value of X in our sample. 
Table 2: Perfects of Type (i)-(iii) 
type (i) (ii) Speech Act/Epistemic 
Persistence (ii-a) 
Evidential Use 
A,B 180 21 
Ex:l. R:20 
a 
c 140 5 
Ex:O,R:5 
D 70 7 
Ex:2,R:5 
E 105 18 
Ex:2, R:l6 
I Toml I 495 I (81.82%) 51 I (8.43%) 
A,B Newspaper 
c Discussion:CQ researcher 
° Conversation:Switchboard 
E Narrative 
(ii-b) 
Topic negotiation 
0 
0 
13 
Ex:O, R:l3 
4 
Ex:2, R:3 
17 
(2.81%) 
(iii) 
Common sense 
9 
Ex:4,R:5 
6 
Ex:4, R:2 
8 
Ex:3,R:5 
5 
Ex:2, R:3 
I 
28 
(4.63%) 
Others 
2 
Ex:l,R:I 
4 
Ex:3 
2 
Ex:2 
6 
Ex:4, R:2 
I 14 (2.31 %) 
a 'Ex: I' and 'R:20' are the numbers of existential and resultative perfect 
readings 
Three differences distinguish Type (i-ii) and Type (iii). First, the entail-
ment rules used in Type (iii), such as those in (19) or (21), are much more 
specific than the kinds of rules used in Type (i) and Type (ii). Second, the 
value of X can be found in the surrounding text, either before or after the 
sentence containing the perfect in Type (iii), as shown in (18) and (20). In 
(18) the first sentence's state description corresponds to the value of X for the 
second sentence, which contains the perfect. In (20) the value of X for the 
perfect in the first sentence is provided by the state description found in the 
second sentence. Third, the perfect in Type (iii) is instrumental in establish-
ing the coherence of the discourse in which the sentence containing it occurs. 
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More precisely, the commonsense entailment rule used to find the value of X 
in Type (iii) is a crucial premise needed to establish the discourse relation be-
tween the sentence that contains the perfect and the sentence that contains the 
state description that is the value of X. 
We illustrate this dual function of the commonsense entailment rule on 
sentence (18), following the approach to discourse coherence developed in 
SDRT (Asher and Lascarides 2003). In SDRT, for two sentences or other 
pieces of text to form a coherent discourse segment, there must be a discourse 
relation R that relates their corresponding meaning representations or DRSs. 
More precisely, R takes two utterances' meaning representations as its argu-
ments (R(n" 1r 2 ) where 1ri is a label for the DRS of an utterance or clause) 
and is nonmonotonically inferred from the information content of utterances, 
discourse contexts, and world knowledge. Our claim is that the use of the per-
fect have .flown in sentence (18) facilitates the establishment of the coherence 
relation R. This is because the perfect triggers a search for the value of X and 
the retrieval of the commonsense rule in (19). The use of this rule, in turn, 
helps establish an evidence coherence relation between the sentence in which 
the perfect occurs and the sentence that includes the state description that is 
the value of X, because of the discourse coherence rule in (22). 
(22) Evidence Rule 
'</a'</(3'</P'</P''</e'</e'((P(e,a) 1\ P'(e',(J) 1\ (P(e) > P'(e')))---> Evi-
dence (a, (3)) 
(22) says that if the eventuality descriptions P and P' are true of e and 
e' in DRSs a and (3 and one can defeasibly infer P'(e') from P(e), then a 
is evidence for (3. In other words, if one makes two claims such that one 
can (defeasibly) infer the truth of the first from that of the second, the second 
claim is evidence in favor of the first claim. By evoking a rule on the basis of 
which one can defeasibly derive P'(e') from P(e), the perfect in (18) helps 
trigger the rule in (22) on which the coherence of the discourse in (18) partly 
rests. The simplified segmented discourse representation structure (SDRS) 
for (18) is shown in Figure 2. (1r 1 and 7r2 are labels for the simplified DRSs 
corresponding to the first and second sentences of (18), respectively). 
5 Conclusion 
Since Reichenbach (194 7), studies of the perfect have recognized the role of 
the English perfect in discourses. But few studies have looked at a large data 
set of perfect examples. This paper has tried to assess anew the role the En-
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1f2: 
7r1,7T2 
s, n 
1r 1 : 1 lraq_stil/Jreep_US . .forces_busy(s) 
T(s) on 
ev,s,n 
Air _Force_fly_l, 500_missions_over _/raq(ev) 
T(ev) -< n 
X(s) 
T(s) on 
X =lraq_sti/l_keep_US . .forces_busy 
Evidence(rr 1. 1r 2) 
Figure 2: SDRS for (18) 
glish perfect plays in discourse by examining the kinds of interpretations 605 
present perfect examples receive and the inferences readers and hearers need 
to make to arrive at these interpretations. Several preliminary conclusions re-
sult from this examination. First, theories of the perfect that hypothesize that 
it presupposes or elaborates a topic do not seem to account for all uses of the 
perfect, in particular its use in conversation to establish or shift topic. Second, 
the overwhelming majority of present perfects are continuative or entailed re-
sultative perfects whose understanding only requires trivial inferences on the 
part of hearers. Third, the remaining examples fall into a few inference pat-
terns that either use general default rules or easily accessible commonsense 
rules. The overall picture that emerges from our corpus study is that determin-
ing the nature of the perfect state posited by theories that treat the perfect as 
a stativizer is a feasible task. Of course, determining the nature of the perfect 
state is not the end of the story. Present perfects serve further "perlocution-
ary" functions in texts and conversations. Although we cannot go into these 
further discourse functions in this paper, let us suggest that each of the types 
of perfect we isolated seems to serve a distinct one. The perfect use in Type 
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(i) and (iia) serve to introduce the value of X in discourse, although Type (iia) 
further qualify this introduction, by mentioning the source of the information 
regarding this state. The perfect use in Type (iib) is used to negotiate topics. 
Finally, the perfect use in Type (iii) serves to establish discourse coherence. 
We summarize these various uses and other differences among the different 
kinds of inferences addressees must perform when interpreting present per-
fects in Table 3. 
Table 3: Inference types and discourse functions 
Type (i) Type (ii) Type (iii) 
(a) Evidential (b) Topic Nego Commonsense 
General inference + + + -
Value X ina - - - + 
surrounding text 
Discourse Introduce Introduce Topic Help establish 
function implicitly X(s) with qualification negotiation discourse 
~the perf_"ct .... in discourse X { s) in discourse relation 
-
'· 
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